The fragile cease-fire in Syria brokered by the U.S. and Russia earlier this year appears all but dead after the country lurched back toward full-scale civil war last week. On Monday, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry traveled to Geneva to restart negotiations aimed at ending the renewed fighting that has killed hundreds of civilians in recent days, including at least 50 people who died last Wednesday when Syrian government planes attacked a children's hospital in a rebel held area of Aleppo (and 19 more who were killed by rebel fire that struck a government controlled hospital today ). But while the U.N. has called the deteriorating situation in Syria's largest city a looming humanitarian disaster, the reality is that neither Washington nor Moscow may be able to dictate what happens next.
The deal Russia and the U.S. agreed to in February was a three-legged stool. The first leg called for a countrywide cessation of hostilities that would freeze the opposing sides in place. The second leg was a requirement to allow international humanitarian aid to reach civilians trapped by the fighting, and the third leg was a process for launching negotiations aimed a reaching a political resolution of the conflict and the establishment of a transitional government. But since the latter two conditions were contingent on the first, Mr. Kerry's efforts effectively have been pushed back to square one.
This was perhaps foreseeable given the gaping loophole in the original cease-fire agreement, which was supposed to apply to all of Syria but which in practice allowed Russia and the Assad regime to continue striking Islamic State fighters and those of the al-Nusra Front, who are not covered under the cease-fire. That exception, which the U.S. has also used to continue bombing ISIS, gave Syrian President Bashar Assad and Russian President Vladimir Putin a convenient excuse for attacking any rebel group or civilian area under the justification of battling ISIS and al-Nusra, which in effect have become convenient scapegoats for Russian attacks throughout Syria.
Moreover, there are thousands of rebel groups operating in Syria that routinely collaborate with each other through temporary alliances of convenience — to strengthen their numbers on the battlefield, for example, or to smuggle weapons and other contraband — and many of them have no real interest in a cessation of hostilities that might disrupt their other activities. That allows Mr. Assad and his backers to claim they are all fair game, and as a result, vast parts of the country across which they operate are likely to remain active conflict zones indefinitely regardless of any cease-fire.
Finally, Russia and the U.S. may no longer have the international credibility to enforce the cease-fire they crafted just a few months ago. Mr. Putin at one point appeared able to influence Mr. Assad's political calculations after he sent Russian warplanes to back up the Syrian government's beleaguered forces. But after the military situation on the ground turned around in Mr. Assad's favor, the Syrian leader seemed little inclined to return the favor by following through on the other elements of the accord. If he's willing to bite the Russian hand that fed him through that crisis there's little likelihood he'll be swayed by Mr. Kerry's diplomatic appeals.
All of which suggests the U.S. may be holding a weak hand when it comes to advancing the peace process amid Syria's fiendishly complex military and diplomatic crosscurrents and competing interests, or even increasing access to humanitarian aid to its beleaguered citizens. There's virtually no chance negotiations for a political transition can go forward as long as the fighting continues, and Mr. Assad now appears to be in a position where he can drag out the conflict indefinitely. Publicly, Mr. Kerry remains hopeful that Russia eventually can be persuaded to take a tougher line in pressuring Mr. Assad to adhere to the cease-fire if only out of its own self interest in showing that Moscow is still a relevant player in the region. But if appealing to Russian national pride is the strongest card the U.S. has to play, the game may already be lost.