Pundits are calling it a Stevenson moment: On Wednesday, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell will address the United Nations Security Council, hoping to persuade its members that war against Iraq is justified.
The Stevenson moment occurred Oct. 25, 1962, when Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, addressed the Security Council during the Cuban missile crisis, when the world faced the very real prospect of nuclear war.
Three days earlier, a somber President John F. Kennedy had addressed the nation, saying spy planes had discovered Soviet missiles in Cuba that could reach the United States.
At the U.N. General Assembly, Stevenson confronted Valerian Zorin, the Soviet ambassador, who refused to say whether the missiles existed. Then came the Stevenson moment: The U.S. ambassador produced spy photos of the missiles in Cuba for the U.N. delegates gathered before him.
Three days later, Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet leader, said he was willing to remove the missiles, and the U.S. secretly promised that it would not invade Cuba. By the end of the year, the missiles had been withdrawn.
Powell is not expected to offer the kind of evidence Stevenson did. There is a parallel, however, in that the prospect that war lies ahead and that the United States wants the world on its side.
Following are excerpts from Stevenson's speech:
I want to say to you, Mr. Zorin, that I do not have your talent for obfuscation, for distortion, for confusing language and for doubletalk. And I must confess to you that I am glad that I do not!
But if I understood what you said, you said that my position had changed, that today I was defensive because we did not have the evidence to prove our assertions that your government had installed long-range missiles in Cuba.
Well, let me say something to you, Mr. Ambassador - we do have the evidence. We have it, and it is clear, and it is incontrovertible. And let me say something else - those weapons must be taken out of Cuba.
Next, let me say to you that, if I understood you, ... you said that our position had changed since I spoke here the other day because of the pressures of world opinion and the majority of the United Nations.
Well, let me say to you, sir, you are wrong again. We have had no pressure from anyone whatsoever. We came in here today to indicate our willingness to discuss [U.N. Secretary-General] U Thant's proposals, and that is the only change that has taken place.
But let me also say to you, sir, that there has been a change. You - the Soviet Union has sent these weapons to Cuba. You - the Soviet Union has upset the balance of power in the world. You-the Soviet Union has created this new danger, not the United States.
And you ask with a fine show of indignation why the president did not tell [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei] Gromyko on last Thursday about our evidence, at the very time that Mr. Gromyko was blandly denying to the president that the U.S.S.R. was placing such weapons on sites in the new world.
Well, I will tell you why: Because we were assembling the evidence, and perhaps it would be instructive to the world to see how a Soviet official - how far he would go in perfidy. Perhaps we wanted to know if this country faced another example of nuclear deceit like that one a year ago, when in stealth the Soviet Union broke the nuclear test moratorium.
And while we are asking questions, let me ask you why your government - your foreign minister - deliberately, cynically deceived us about the nuclear build-up in Cuba. ...
All right, sir, let me ask you one simple question: Do you, Ambassador Zorin, deny that the U.S.S.R. has placed and is placing medium- and intermediate-range missiles at sites in Cuba? Yes or no - don't wait for the translation - yes or no?
[Zorin did not answer.]
You can answer yes or no. You have denied they exist. I want to know if I understood you correctly. I am prepared to wait for my answer until hell freezes over, if that's your decision. And I am also prepared to present the evidence in this room. ...
I am going to make a portion of the evidence available right now. If you will indulge me for a moment, we will set up an easel here in the back of the room where I hope it will be visible to everyone.
The first of these exhibits shows an area north of the village of Candelaria, near San Cristobal, southwest of Havana. ...
The first photograph shows the area in late August 1962; it was then, if you can see from where you are sitting, only a peaceful countryside. The second photograph shows the same area one day last week. A few tents and vehicles had come into the area, new spur roads had appeared, and the main road had been improved.
The third photograph, taken only 24 hours later, shows facilities for a medium-range missile battalion installed. There are tents for 400 or 500 men. At the end of the new spur road there are seven 1,000- mile missile trailers. There are four launcher-erector mechanisms for placing these missiles in erect firing position. ... All of this, I remind you, took place in twenty-four hours.
The second exhibit, which you can all examine at your leisure, shows three successive photographic enlargements of another missile base of the same type in the area of San Cristobal. These enlarged photographs clearly show six of these missiles on trailers and three erectors. And that is only one example of the first type of ballistic missile installation in Cuba.
A second type of installation is designed for a missile of intermediate range - a range of about 2,200 miles. ...
The exhibit on this type of missile shows a launching area being constructed near Guanajay, southwest of the city of Havana. As in the first exhibit, a map and small photograph show this area as it appeared in late August 1962, when no military activities were apparent.
A second large photograph shows the same area about six weeks later. Here you will see a very heavy construction effort to push the launching area to rapid completion. The pictures show two large concrete bunkers or control centers in process of construction, one between each pair of launching pads. ... The installation is not yet complete, and no warheads are yet visible.
The next photograph shows a closer view of the same intermediate-range launch site. You can clearly see one of the pairs of large concrete launch pads, with a concrete building from which launching operations for three pads are controlled. ...
Now, in addition to missiles, the Soviet Union is installing other offensive weapons in Cuba. The next photograph is of an airfield ... in western Cuba.
On this field you will see 22 crates designed to transport the fuselages of Soviet Ilyushin-28 bombers. Four of the aircraft are uncrated, and one is partially assembled. These bombers, sometimes known as Beagles, have an operating radius of about 750 miles and are capable of carrying nuclear weapons.
At the same field you can see one of the surface-to-air anti-aircraft guided missile bases, with six missiles per base. ...
As to the authenticity of the photographs, which Mr. Zorin has spoken about with such scorn, I wonder if the Soviet Union would ask its Cuban colleague to permit a U.N. team to go to these sites. If so, I can assure you that we can direct them to the proper places very quickly.
And now I hope that we can get down to business, that we can stop this sparring. We know the facts, and so do you, sir, and we are ready to talk about them. Our job here is not to score debating points. Our job, Mr. Zorin, is to save the peace. And if you are ready to try, we are.