WASHINGTON - The Bush administration has prepared a comprehensive plan to intensify financial and political pressure on North Korea if it does not abandon its efforts to make nuclear weapons, the ultimate aim being to confront the nation with the prospect of economic collapse, according to senior administration officials.
Under the new policy, neighbors would be encouraged to reduce economic ties with North Korea, the United Nations Security Council could threaten economic sanctions, and the American military might intercept missile shipments to deprive North Korea of money from weapon sales.
Administration officials said the threat of increasing isolation is the best way to force North Korea to give up its nuclear ambitions or - failing that - to bring down the regime. Officials say that under the plan, which they call "tailored containment," they are willing to negotiate with Pyongyang only if it dismantles its nuclear weapons program.
Offering new incentives to North Korea to abandon its weapons program, officials say, would be giving in to blackmail and would reward the regime for failing to meet its earlier commitments.
"It is called 'tailored containment' because this is an entirely different situation than Iraq or Iran," a senior administration official said. "It is a lot about political stress and putting economic stress. It also requires maximum multinational cooperation."
The situation in North Korea, meanwhile, continues to escalate. The International Atomic Energy Agency said yesterday that it would withdraw two inspectors by Tuesday at the request of North Korea, which it said was defying international obligations.
Some experts say that the Bush administration's tough stance may have prompted the North Koreans to expand their nuclear weapons program and that Washington's containment policy lacks a vital element: an open diplomatic channel with North Korea.
"I think the Bush administration's tough rhetoric and tough policies toward North Korea have unnerved the North Koreans and perhaps led them to conclude that the only way for them to ensure security is to confront the world with a fait accompli by rapidly acquiring a substantial nuclear arsenal," said Robert Einhorn, a senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, who led negotiations with the North Koreans during the Clinton administration.
The Bush administration's new containment policy, Einhorn said, "is a gamble that the North Korean regime will collapse before it acquires a substantial nuclear arsenal that threatens the stability of East Asia.
"It's also a gamble that our relationship with our South Korean ally can survive a lengthy period of isolating and pressuring North Korea," he said. "Engaging North Korea has its downsides, but those must be weighed against the risks of not engaging."
There are important consequences. By reprocessing the spent fuel from its Yongbyon reactor, North Korea could acquire about five bombs' worth of plutonium in six months or less, according to administration officials and outside experts.
Restarting the Yongbyon reactor, on which the North Koreans seem intent, would enable the country to churn out enough plutonium to build a bomb a year.
The eventual construction of a network for enriching uranium would give North Korea yet another means of expanding its nuclear arsenal. The system could be finished by the middle of the decade, its intention seemingly to produce enough material for two bombs a year, according to the CIA.
North Korea has long been one of the most vexing foreign policy problems. The Clinton administration was faced with a similar crisis in the early 1990s when North Korea removed the fuel from its research reactor at Yongbyon and indicated that it might reprocess the spent fuel to produce bomb-grade plutonium.
The Clinton administration developed plans for a pre-emptive military strike on North Korea's reprocessing plant before reaching an agreement with Pyongyang. Under the deal, North Korea agreed to freeze and ultimately eliminate its nuclear program.
In return, Washington promised a multinational effort to ship heavy fuel oil to North Korea and to build two light-water nuclear reactors, which could provide electricity but would be less useful in producing bomb-grade material.
In its final year, the Clinton administration tried to negotiate a pact that would have required North Korea to give up its long-range missiles and end missile exports, but Clinton's term ended before a deal was reached.
Later, North Korean diplomats indicated that they wanted to continue the negotiations with the Bush administration. The new officials, though, were far more skeptical of North Korea's intentions.
In October, James Kelly, the senior State Department official for Asia, went to Pyongyang for what the North Koreans thought would be the first diplomatic meeting with the administration. Kelly told the North Koreans that Washington had no intention of invading the nation but had concerns about Pyongyang's record on human rights and its conventional military buildup.
Kelly also accused North Korea of having a uranium enrichment program - which Pyongyang later confirmed - and said it would have to be dismantled before serious talks could continue.
The two days of meetings did not go well.
Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan suggested that North Korea had no need for the "bold approach" and that the people and the army loved Kim Jong Il, North Korea's leader.
First Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju said North Korea was entitled to have nuclear weapons. He said that the North Koreans needed a nonaggression pact with the United States and that critical issues should be settled at a summit between North Korea's leader and President Bush.
Back in Washington, the Bush administration was hammering out its newest policy. The delivery of fuel oil was halted. Officials said the plan to build light-water reactors could be scrapped.
Other steps to increase the "stress" on North Korea's economy were planned, including having North Korea's actions referred to the U.N. Security Council, which could impose economic sanctions.
But the North Koreans did not relent.
Instead of agreeing to dismantle their nuclear program, they announced that they would restart the Yongbyon reactor, expel inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency, remove monitoring equipment, and reopen the factory that reprocesses plutonium.
Experts have offered various theories about North Korea's motivations. Some say the North Koreans want to negotiate with Washington from a position of strength. Others speculate that Pyongyang thinks it is unlikely to win substantial concessions from the Bush administration, that it has watched the United States plan to invade Iraq and concluded that its security is best guarded by having a nuclear arsenal.
Critics of the Bush administration's new policy say there is no substitute for direct negotiations with the United States. They say the administration should at least offer some incentives, such as a formal declaration that United States has no hostile intentions toward North Korea.
"The Bush administration is calculating that the North Koreans will eventually back down," said Joel Wit, a senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a former State Department specialist on North Korea.
"The administration needs to come up with a coherent approach that combines tough measures with dialogue," he said.