"Through God's blessing, Harper's Ferry and its garrison are to be surrendered," Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson informed his commander, Gen. Robert E. Lee, after the capitulation of Union forces at Harper's Ferry, which was then in Virginia, on Sept. 15, 1862.

Jackson's capture of Harper's Ferry resulted in the largest surrender of United States troops during the Civil War.

Lee implemented a three-pronged attack to capture the Union arsenal at Harper's Ferry. The Confederacy was now on the offensive, hoping to bring the war away from Richmond, Va., and into Maryland.

Lee required a protected line of communication, and the best supply route was west of the Blue Ridge up the Shenandoah Valley. Food and ammunition were transported north by railway as far as Harper's Ferry, which lay at the confluence of the Shenandoah and the Potomac rivers.

Lee had hoped that the Union garrisons would abandon Harper's Ferry and the nearby railroad town of Martinsburg, but the Union forces did not leave and continued to threaten his supply line from Virginia.

Lee decided to seize both places. By occupying the high ground around Harper's Ferry - Maryland Heights, Loudoun Heights and Bolivar Heights - Lee hoped to force a Union surrender or withdrawal.

On Sept. 10, 1862, Lee ordered Jackson to move at once from his camp at Frederick toward Harper's Ferry.

'Mystery, mystery'

At 3 a.m., Jackson embarked on his mission, and as he left the town of Frederick, he attempted to deceive the townsfolk by inquiring about directions for Chambersburg and other places in Pennsylvania. According to one of his officers, Maj. Henry Kyd Douglas, "his questions only illustrated his well-known motto, 'Mystery, mystery is the secret of success.'"

Jackson's column proceeded to cross South Mountain at Turner's Gap and by Sept. 11 Jackson was en route to Martinsburg.

Mary Bedinger Mitchell, who lived in the path of both armies, recalled Jackson's troops as they rapidly marched to their destination:

"I know something of an appearance of a marching army, both Union and Southern. There are always stragglers, of course, but never before or after did I see anything comparable to the demoralized state of the Confederates at this time. Never were want and exhaustion more visibly put before my eyes, and that they could march or fight at all seemed incredible."

But this demoralized army would soon taste victory.

Meanwhile, Union Brig. Gen. Julius White was in command of approximately 2,000 men in Martinsburg. He decided not to await Jackson's attack, but instead marched his men to a more secure position at Harper's Ferry.

Upon his arrival, White relinquished his position of senior Union officer to Col. Dixon Stansbury Miles because of his own lack of military experience. White was not a career military officer; up until a few months earlier he had been a customs collector in Chicago.

12,000 Union troops

There were approximately 12,000 Union troops in Harper's Ferry, most of whom were untrained, volunteer, three-month infantry enlistees who had been assigned to guard the bridges and track of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad.

Miles had been given strict orders by his superior, Maj. Gen. John E. Wool: "You will not abandon Harper's Ferry without defending it to the last extremity. ... There must be no abandoning of a post, and shoot the first man that thinks of it."

Miles replied, "I am ready for them."

By Sept. 14, Jackson's troops were strung along School House Ridge and facing the Union left on Bolivar Heights, a ridge about a mile and a half west of Harper's Ferry running from the Potomac to the Shenandoah.

Confederate Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws and his approximately 8,000 troops had already seized Maryland Heights and had in position several artillery pieces.

Col. James A. Walker had taken Loudoun Heights against light resistance and had positioned several artillery pieces on its crest.

From these three positions, the Confederates could fire rounds into the federal garrison at Harper's Ferry.

On the afternoon of Sept. 14, Jackson realized that artillery fire would not be enough to subdue the garrison. So he sent Maj. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill's division along the left bank of the Shenandoah in an effort to turn the Union left on Bolivar Heights.

This maneuver was the key to the Confederate army's success.

The turning point

According to Marsha Starkey, public information officer for Harper's Ferry National Historical Park: "The turning point was probably when Jackson ordered A.P. Hill to maneuver around to the Shenandoah River.

"In the snaking movement, using School House Ridge as a cover, he was able to place artillery and infantry lines across the fields of the Chambers (today, Murphy) Farm, cutting off any chance of escape for the Union garrison."

Jackson had methodically attempted to strangle Harper's Ferry, and if he held the three heights, victory would be guaranteed.

Hill marched his six brigades obliquely to the right behind School House Ridge, and when he reached the Shenandoah, he slowly made his way along the bank. He used a hilly prominence on the extreme Union left as his main target.

At nightfall, Hill's men trudged up the steep ravines to reach the rear of the Union line along Bolivar Heights. The Union left heard the commotion and fired into the darkness.

Captain Armstrong of the 125th New York Infantry recalled, "We were told that a battle was expected here every minute. ... We stood in the cool and thoughtful evening hour after hour, some of us waiting, as it seemed, our final summons."

The Union forces barely resisted, which allowed Hill to position two brigades within 150 yards of a redoubt on the Union left. The remaining four brigades and five batteries of artillery were positioned 1,000 yards behind the Union flank. Hill's approximately 3,000 men awaited daylight.

Jackson had distributed additional firepower closer to the left of Bolivar Heights to support Hill's brigades. In response to this potential frontal and rear assault, the Union troops took refuge in small valleys along Bolivar Heights.

Still, during the night of Sept. 14 and the next morning, Jackson's chief of artillery, Stapleton Crutchfield, maneuvered 10 guns from School House Ridge across the Shenandoah River to a shelf at the bottom of Loudoun Heights. His gunners would be able to fire at Bolivar Heights and make the ravines in which the Union troops had sought refuge a vulnerable place.

Jackson's movements were enveloped by darkness and no one knew at Harper's Ferry how strategically aligned the Confederate army was.

The fog lifts

The dense night fog lifted by dawn Sept. 15. The Confederate army had surrounded the Union positions and cannons were placed at every corner.

Firing immediately broke out. "The infernal screech owls came hissing and singing," said Lt. James Clark of the 115th New York Infantry.

The Confederates had a dominating field of fire. According to Lt. Henry Binney, an aide to Miles, "Nothing could stand before such a raking cannonade."

Ferocious fighting persisted for about an hour, and Miles was forced to reconsider his situation. His men were in exposed positions, and his batteries had no long-range ammunition. His flank would collapse, and there was no apparent rescue coming from the Army of the Potomac.

The Confederate forces were also positioned to strike his left. During the heated enfilade fire that pounded Bolivar Heights, it would have been impossible for him to execute a masterful defense.

Miles convened a council of war with two of his brigade commanders and General White; they unanimously decided to surrender. Between 8 a.m. and 9 a.m., white flags arose along Bolivar Heights.

The Confederates continued to fire despite this signal because of the lingering fog and smoke. Miles was mortally wounded by a shell that exploded behind him. Jackson met with White, demanding unconditional capitulation, and ordered Hill to stay behind to handle the arrangements.

Jackson then rode into Harper's Ferry to inspect the garrison, where he stocked up on supplies, taking two days' worth of rations, and prepared for the journey toward Sharpsburg.

According to Antietam, Essays on the 1862 Maryland Campaign, published in 1962 and edited by Gary W. Gallagher, the capture of Harper's Ferry produced 73 pieces of artillery, 13,000 small arms, 200 wagons, and 12,500 prisoners.

"The Battle of Harper's Ferry is considered Jackson's most complete victory," said Starkey of the National Park Service.

"His use of artillery and the ordered movement of A.P. Hill's troops sealed the fate of the Union garrison. He did not use infantry to directly attack Bolivar Heights from School House Ridge during the day. This would have been a blood bath.

"Instead, he ordered Hill to move and ordered a feigned night assault on Bolivar Heights to direct the Union attention there, further covering Hill's movement."

The government, the press, and army leaders intensely speculated on the cause of this Union disaster. The War Department organized a commission to investigate the situation under the authority of Maj. Gen. David Hunter.

Over two weeks, the commission interviewed 44 witnesses and asked 1,800 questions. Their focus was directed toward the leadership of Miles, his defense strategy, his subordinates' actions, as well as his opportunities to save the U.S. garrison. The official report found Col. Thomas H. Ford's defense strategy responsible for the fall of Maryland Heights.

Miles scrutinized

In the official report, Miles was highly scrutinized because of his "incapacity, amounting to almost imbecility [for] the shameful surrender of this post."

"Had the garrison been slower to surrender or the Army of the Potomac swifter to march," the commission stated, "the enemy would have been forced to raise the siege or have been taken in detail."

According to Starkey, many of the Union soldiers felt disgrace at surrendering and blamed Miles.

On the morning of Sept. 15, Miles was surrounded, the garrison's long-range artillery was almost exhausted and there were no reinforcements in sight. Thus, he surrendered.

The surrender at Harper's Ferry is said to have been overshadowed by the Battle of Antietam. Yet the magnitude of the Southern victory is evident in the extensive coverage by the Northern newspapers even seven weeks after the battle.

"The Battle of Harper's Ferry was like setting in motion a series of dominos that fell," Starkey explained. "Jackson's victory permitted Lee to make a stand at Sharpsburg, Maryland."

The surrender at Harper's Ferry swung the pendulum of the war in Confederate favor, but there was little time to revel in this triumph. Jackson was forced to march toward Sharpsburg along the banks of Antietam Creek to relieve Lee. Another battle was soon to be joined.