"I could see dimly through the dense sulphurous battle smoke, and a line from Shakespeare's Tempest filtered through my brain: 'Hell is empty and all the devils are here.'" Such was the scene, as described by Pvt. Frederick Foard, of the 20th North Carolina Infantry, at Turner's Gap, on South Mountain that Sept. 14, 1862.
From the early morning until long after sunset, the fighting there involved skirmishes and repeated attacks, through which neither side could gain a true advantage.
The struggle at Turner's Gap, within the larger Battle of South Mountain, resulted in a victory for the Union army, which suffered far fewer casualties than its enemy. But it gave a psychological lift to the Confederates, who were able to hold off an army 10 times their size for nearly 13 hours.
On the afternoon of Sept. 13, Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee learned that several Union brigades would be traveling by the Boonsboro Road. As a defensive measure, Lee instructed Maj. Gen. Daniel H. Hill and his troops, through a dispatch delivered by Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart, to "hold the gap."
Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, the message assured, would be sent from Hagerstown to provide additional Confederate support. So Hill saw Turner's Gap as a routine assignment.
Hill made immediate plans to move. Stuart's dispatch, making mention of only two Union regiments, provided him a false sense of comfort. As a result, Hill sent in only two of his brigades, those of Brig. Gen. Samuel Garland and Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Colquitt, as well as the batteries of Capt. J.W. Bondurant and Capt. John Lane.
Rough and narrow
Hill and Colquitt conducted a brief ground examination that evening and discovered that the gap, situated in 1,000-foot-high South Mountain, was a rough and narrow terrain, covered with timber.
The area encompassed dense forests, open fields, steep slopes, and high ridges, making it difficult for the Confederates to develop a general defensive strategy. The inspection did, however, force Hill to realize that he would need additional troops.
While the Southern leaders struggled to familiarize themselves with the terrain, their enemy was also preparing for battle.
Union Brig. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton, who was entrusted with the advance of Maj. Gen. Jesse Lee Reno's 9th Corps on the south side of the pike, had investigated the area a day before. And the Union commander, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, had recovered Lee's instructions for his generals (Special Orders No. 191) providing a detailed outline of the Confederate plans. Armed with such crucial information, the Union forces were confident of success.
McClellan ordered a counterstrike by Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin and Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside. As morning broke on Sept. 14, Hill arrived from Boonsboro to make his reconnaissance for the Confederate forces. He was shocked by the vast number of Union troops before him.
In an 1886 magazine article, Fighting for Time at Turner's and Fox's Gap, Hill recalled that "the marching columns extended back as far as the eye could see in the distance; but many of the troops had already arrived and were in the double lines of battle, and those advancing were taking up positions as fast as they arrived."
'Glorious spectacle'
"It was a grand, glorious spectacle, and it was impossible to look at it without admiration. I had never seen so tremendous an army before, and I did not see one like it afterward."
Upon discovering that Stuart had moved on to Crampton's Gap, Hill knew he was vastly outnumbered. How, he wondered, could he cover so much ground with so few troops?
He positioned Col- quitt's brigade near the mountain summit and the 23rd and 28th Georgia regiments on the northern pike. The three remaining regiments, the 13th Alabama and the 6th and 27th Georgia, were assigned to the south side.
The skirmishing at Turner's Gap began about 9 a.m. on Wise's field. The day was filled with charges and counter-charges, but neither side could secure a lasting advantage. From morning until after 3 p.m., Hill held the gap, entirely unaided, against a combined assault from two Union corps.
During the afternoon, Col- quitt's brigade held the line's center, between Hagerstown Pike and the mountaintop, along the National Road, against the brigade of Union Brig. Gen. John Gibbon.
Gibbon's troops, who won the name "The Iron Brigade" at South Mountain, launched strong, repeated offensives against the Georgia regiments. Yet not an inch of ground was yielded by the Confederates. Thus, Colquitt also earned a title that day: "The Rock of South Mountain."
To Colquitt's right were positioned the forces of Brig. Gen. Thomas F. Drayton, Col. George T. Anderson, Brig. Gen. Roswell S. Ripley and Brig. Gen. George B. Anderson; to his left, Brig. Gens. Robert E. Rodes, Nathan G. Evans, James L. Kemper, George E. Pickett (under Brig. Gen. Richard B. Garnett) and Micah Jenkins (under Col. Joseph Walker).
Hill's Confederates, though severely outnumbered, held their position using barely sufficient artillery and an abundance of spirit. This impressed even their enemies. Union Maj. Gen. Jacob Cox would later praise Hill's resilience in an official report, calling the repeated Confederate attacks of "great obstinacy and boldness."
About 3:30 p.m., Longstreet's troops arrived from Hagerstown and took up position on Hill's right side. Tired and battle-worn, the additional Southern troops appeared on the field too late to change the outcome of the fighting.
Still uncertain how many Confederates were on the mountain, Reno held off commanding a general advance until all of his forces were present. Union brigades continued to flood the field through the day. Brig. Gen. Orlando Willcox arrived with his troops at noon. Troops under Brig. Gen. Samuel Sturgis and Brig. Gen. Isaac Rodman appeared between 3 p.m. and 4 p.m.
In his 1886 article, Hill asserted: "The Federals were under the self-imposed illusion that there was a very large force opposed to them, whereas here was only one weak division until late in the afternoon.
"It was a battle of delusions also, for, by moving about from point to point and meeting the foe wherever he presented himself, the Confederates deluded the Federals into the belief that the whole mountain was swarming with rebels."
'A fierce attack'
Confederate Brig. Gen. Richard B. Garnett stated in an official report, dated Nov. 2, 1862, "The brigade sustained for some time a fierce attack by doubtless many times their number. It has been subsequently ascertained that Gen. McClellan's army, consisting of at least 80,000 men, assailed our position, only defended by General D.H. Hill's division and a part of General Longstreet's corps."
The Union general advance was finally ordered at 5 p.m. Reno assigned Cox to defend his immediate left and Willcox, with Sturgis' support, his immediate right. Fairchild was posted at the extreme left and Harland on the extreme right. Rodman's brigade was divided among these areas. With such numbers, the Union forces showed an expansive and well-organized front.
In The Battles of Antietam and Fredericksburg, written in 1885, then-Brig. Gen. Francis Winthrop Palfrey reports that "the general scheme of it was that Reno's men should close in upon the Gap from the ground which they had won to the south, while Hooker's men were to reach the same point by circling round through the valley which formed the approach from the north to the Mountain House."
The skirmishing continued through nightfall, primarily north of the pike and in the forest surrounding the gap. About 7 p.m., Reno was killed in Wise's field, a severe blow to Union morale.
In Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Cox described his last several moments with the determined commander: "A little before sunset, Reno came up in person, anxious to know why the right could not get forward quite to the summit. After a few moments conversation with me, he passed on to Sturgis; it seems to me he was hardly gone before he was brought back upon the stretcher, dead."
The firing continued for several more hours in that area of the field but the Confederates could not recover positioning or momentum.
Orders to withdraw
Late in the evening of Sept. 14, Lee ordered his forces to withdraw. Hill and Longstreet accordingly pulled back their men about 11 p.m. and retreated to Sharpsburg.
Union forces suffered minimal losses at Turner's Gap, with about 300 killed and 1,500 wounded. The Confederates fared worse, reporting about 2,000 killed and wounded and 1,500 taken prisoner.
Both sides claimed victory.
Union Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker offered his analysis: "When the advantages of the enemy's position are considered, and his preponderating numbers, the forcing of the passage of South Mountain will be classed among the most brilliant and satisfactory achievements of this army, and its principal glory will be awarded to the 1st Corps."
But Hill saw it differently. "If the battle of South Mountain was fought to prevent the advance of McClellan, it was a failure on the part of the Confederates. If it was fought to save Lee's trains and artillery, and to reunite his scattered forces, it was a Confederate success."
Hill saw a greater achievement of his forces.
The battle, he wrote, shows "the effect of hallucination in enabling 9,000 men to hold 30,000 at bay for so many hours, in robbing victory of its fruits, and in inspiring the victors with such caution that a simple ruse turned them back in their triumphal career."
Moira Curran is a senior majoring in communications at Loyola College in Baltimore; this article was written during a practicum at The Sun.