Where the Potomac and the Shenandoah rivers meet, cleaving the Blue Ridge, lies Harper's Ferry. In 1859, it was a thriving community, a transportation hub and site of a federal armory. That year the town was catapulted onto the world stage by John Brown's unsuccessful raid on the armory. This was the opening curtain of the Civil War.

In May 1862, Union Col. Dixon Stansbury Miles was assigned as commander of the Union garrison at Harper's Ferry. His primary duty was to guard the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and its bridges, and to give the Union control of this gateway to the west and the south.

Miles was a prominent player in the acts and omissions that led to the surrender of Harper's Ferry - and thus the deadly drama of Antietam. The little-known, but controversial, role Miles played is variously characterized by the damning words "incompetence, treachery, betrayal, treason," even "murder."

In his book The American Conflict, Horace Greeley described his view of Miles at the First Battle of Manassas as follows:

"Col. D.S. Miles, a Marylander, commanding the 5th [reserve] division, was drunk throughout the action, and playing the buffoon; riding about to attract observation, with two hats on his head, one within the other. As, however, he was pretty certainly a traitor, and was not ordered to advance, it is hardly probable that his drunkenness did any serious damage, save as it disgusted and disheartened those whose lives were in his hands."

Greeley was not an eyewitness to the battle, and his demeaning characterization of Miles stirred its own controversy.

Career destroyed

According to Paul Teeter's book A Matter of Hours, these charges had the effect of "destroying forever whatever chance Miles had for high command during the rest of the Civil War."

In Six Years of Hell, Chester G. Hearn recounts that even though Miles had nearly 40 years of career army service, "no longer did Washington trust the gray-haired colonel with an important infantry division.

"In March 1862, the War Department sent him to Harper's Ferry with little more than a regiment to guard the tracks of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. ... The Railroad Brigade [was] comprised mostly of militia and green troops with short enlistments."

Many volunteers were young men seeking adventure, not a military career. They fully expected to be mustered out at the end of their enlistment.

Their commander at Harper's Ferry came from a long line of Maryland gentry with a strong military background and pronounced Southern leanings. Orphaned at age 4, Miles was raised by his uncle and namesake, Maj. Dixon Stansbury.

At the ancestral home, Stansbury's Prospect, war stories were often told by the family, proud of its military history. They would easily fill a youngster's head with wonder, and perhaps inspiration.

So it was no surprise that, with the help of influential backers, Miles was accepted to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1819.

On July 1, 1824, he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the U.S. Army and began a career of four decades that would end at Harper's Ferry.

It remains a mystery whether Miles consciously decided to deliver the town to the Confederate forces. Any assessment of that question must be made in the context of the curious combination of events in September 1862.

In late August, Company B of the 12th Virginia Cavalry burned a Winchester and Harper's Ferry train. Col. Benjamin F. Davis' 8th New York Cavalry captured the Virginians and their commander, Lt. Milton Rouse, Sept. 5 and took them to Harper's Ferry.

Davis and Rouse waited for some time to speak with Miles. When Rouse complained loudly of pain from a thigh wound, Davis finally sent him with a surgeon to the base hospital. Rouse, known for his derring-do, promptly escaped, but was recaptured the next day.

Miles then met privately with Rouse for about an hour. Lt. Henry Martin Binney, Miles' aide, joined the two during the last portion of the interview. The Harper's Ferry Commission report quotes Binney:

"Colonel Miles did everything he could to worm out of him the position of the enemy and what their plans were, but he could get no information of any importance at all from him. There was considerable talk with regard to his parole. There seemed to be quite a feeling of censure against Colonel Miles for it. I reported to Colonel Miles what I heard in that line."

Miles summarily dismissed the concern in light of the then-common practice of prisoner parole. Finally, Miles paroled the young cavalry officer, and Binney returned him to the south through the Union lines on Bolivar Heights.

'Unusual opportunity'

Teeter challenges the motive for that parole in his book:

"There is, of course, no comparison between the normal formal exchange procedures usually employed in such cases and Miles' indefensible action in this instance, sending Rouse home immediately through the front lines.

"Most significant for present purposes is the unusual opportunity which Rouse's private interrogation necessarily afforded Miles to send a message - if he so desired - to Rouse's superiors, among whom was the young man's recent teacher at Virginia Military Institute, Professor Thomas J. [Stonewall] Jackson."

Except for Miles' ignoring the earlier order from Maj. Gen. John E. Wool to build a blockhouse on Maryland Heights, the Rouse interview seems to be the first expression of any possibly traitorous intent. The interview could have proved to be a direct communication to Jackson, and thus to Gen. Robert E. Lee.

According to Lt. Gen. James Longstreet's autobiography, From Manassas to Appomattox, the vulnerability of Harper's Ferry was known to Confederate leaders.

Longstreet came to Lee's tent and found him with Jackson. He was immediately invited in. "The two were discussing the move against Harper's Ferry, both heartily approving it. They had gone so far that it seemed useless for me to offer any further opposition," Longstreet wrote.

In A Matter of Hours, Teeter concludes: "In any event it is plain that, on conferring with Jackson, Lee learned something that changed his tentative judgment of two days previously. ... .

"Lee's almost incredible decision to divide his army in enemy territory immediately after a proven opportunity for communication between Jackson and Miles becomes a significant circumstance which simply cannot be dismissed in weighing the case against Dixon Miles."

Not perhaps coincidentally, Lee's new four-pronged invasion of Maryland now included Harper's Ferry as an objective for Jackson and his force of 10,000. Not surprisingly, Jackson's forces included Company B of the 12th Virginia Cavalry - led by Lt. Milton Rouse.

The Southern threat to Harper's Ferry would eventually prevent 12,000 or so Union troops from going to Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's aid at Antietam.

Col. Thomas H. Ford, organizer and commander of the 32nd Ohio Volunteers, had been assigned to defend Maryland Heights against Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws.

His subordinate, Capt. Eugene McGrath, pleaded in vain with Miles for two cannon and men to defend Solomon's Gap, the back door to Maryland Heights. Miles promised both, but failed to deliver either.

By Friday night, Sept. 12, Harper's Ferry had lost communication with the outside world. The telegraph wires were cut and couriers were at great risk in getting through the lines.

Miles ordered a supply of "combustibles" to be assembled at a point on the southeast slope of Maryland Heights. In the event of a Confederate attack, the fire was to signal the artillery to open up instead of an infantry assault.

But Miles' orders caused confusion and chaos the next morning. The huge naval guns were spiked and rolled down the hill. This accomplished everything the Confederates could have wanted. It created so much uncertainty and confusion that the fall of Harper's Ferry was assured.

During the battle for Maryland Heights that Saturday morning, Miles met secretly with Ford in the old Unsell farmhouse, used by Ford as a headquarters. Elizabeth Brown was in an upstairs bedroom when she heard a conversation below. She went to a stovepipe hole, lifted up the tin cover and saw Miles and Ford talking. At the Harper's Ferry Commission hearing she testified:

"I heard Colonel Miles tell you [Ford] that your men would have to fall back to the Ferry; they could not hold the heights; the thing was impossible; the rebel force was too strong.

"You rose to your feet and swore you would be damned if you could not hold it, provided he [Miles] would send reinforcements. He said he had sent all he could spare. You were swearing and said that it was a shame that the men should have to give up."

Ford evacuated Maryland Heights when he realized that reinforcements were not coming and that Miles' prediction at the Unsell farmhouse was about to come true.

Dismay, disapproval

Oddly, Miles expressed dismay and disapproval when he saw Ford's troops leaving.

According to A Matter of Hours, about 9 p.m. Saturday, Sept. 13, Miles gave an oral message to Capt. Charles Russell, the "fighting parson" of the 1st Maryland Cavalry: "for 'any general of the United States Army or any telegraph station, or, if possible, to get to McClellan, whom he [Miles] supposed was at Frederick,' to report that he [Miles] thought he could hold out 48 hours; that he had subsistence for 48 hours; but if he was not relieved in that time he would have to surrender the place."

This was not true, but it reduced the sense of urgency for McClellan and Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin, on his way to relieve Harper's Ferry.

McClellan and Franklin thus believed that Miles would hold out until Tuesday. In fact, McClellan sent a return message by Russell (as reported in McClellan's Official Report, dated Aug. 4, 1863):

"You may count on our making every effort to relieve you. You may rely upon my speedily accomplishing that object. Hold out to the last extremity."

It is a matter of record that Capt. Henry Cole delivered McClellan's message to Miles, who read it and slipped it in his pocket.

Miles later moved his proposed surrender back from Monday night, Sept. 15, to Monday morning. This was immediately after Cole's return and before Cole led the Potomac Home Brigade's cavalry to safety.

Miles had steadfastly refused to let the cavalry go until a delegation of cavalry officers convinced him that the 1,500 horses were of no use at Harper's Ferry. They were especially vulnerable to cannon fire, the officers pointed out, and if captured would be a genuine prize for the South.

Miles finally relented and the cavalry escaped across the pontoon bridge in a column of twos to the Maryland side of the Potomac and north to safety. In the process, they encountered a Confederate force and altered their route. This led them to an ammunition train of Longstreet. They captured 60 wagons and a number of Confederate prisoners.

Meanwhile, the Union infantry implored Miles to lead them in a rush down the Potomac to Washington in a similar effort to escape. Miles refused on the grounds that it was unwise and, further, that his orders were to defend Harper's Ferry - not necessarily Maryland Heights or even Bolivar Heights. They would stay and fight.

Instead they stayed and surrendered at 9 a.m. Sept. 15.

In his book Lost Victories, The Military Genius of Stonewall Jackson, Bevin Alexander says that Jackson's men "marched more than 60 miles in 3 1/2 days." They arrived at Harper's Ferry about midday on Sept. 13.

Meanwhile, McClellan's men found a copy of Special Order No. 191 outlining Lee's altered plans, which included capturing Harper's Ferry. But McClellan waited an unthinkable 18 hours before acting on the new information. This delay plus Miles' changing the surrender to Monday morning finally delivered Harper's Ferry to Jackson.

Bombardment of Bolivar Heights by Confederate Maj. Gen. John G. Walker began after 24 hours of suspended action on both sides.

This coincidental cease-fire could support the theory of a pre-arrangement or cooperation between Miles and Jackson. There is strong evidence that Jackson expected to start surrender negotiations only when all his forces were in place.

'A day or so'

Further, in a conversation between Miles and Col. Daniel Cameron, about noon Sunday, as reported in the Official Records compiled by the federal government after the war, "I asked him [Miles] when he supposed the assault would be made upon us. He said he did not believe there was going to be any; that the enemy were not going to throw away their men, as they knew our condition; it was only a matter of a day or so."

This suggests that having sent Southern parolees back through the weakest part of his lines - the Union left at Bolivar Heights - Miles could count on their revealing the disposition of Union forces and their vulnerabilities. The 24-hour lull seems to have been in the minds of both Miles and Jackson. But the reason may never be known for certain.

If Jackson knew the Union left was weak, Miles must certainly have known it. That sector was south of the Charlestown Pike. All night, the Union had listened to the Confederate voices as they positioned their guns. Rebel campfires spread across the plateau west of Bolivar Heights.

At dawn Monday, the attack began with a thunderous and sustained barrage from some 50 Confederate cannon. After about an hour, during which Miles held a council of war with his commanders, there was a lull in the cannon fire.

The outcome was reported by Union Brig. Gen. Julius White in "The Capitulation of Harper's Ferry," in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, published in 1887.

"The surrender was determined upon unanimously by a council of war when further resistance seemed useless, inasmuch as the commanding positions were held by the enemy in a force of not less than 40,000 of all arms in front, on both flanks, and in rear."

The halt in action was originally a Confederate signal to begin the infantry assault. At this point, Miles dispatched White to negotiate honorable terms of surrender with Jackson. Miles and Binney took out large white handkerchiefs and together rode back and forth, waving the handkerchiefs to signal the Confederate artillery to cease fire.

The Confederates apparently did not see the truce signal and continued firing for half an hour or so. It was during this period that Miles was mortally wounded. He was one of five Union officers to die in the fighting at Harper's Ferry.

Among the varying accounts of his death, three are prominent.

In Lost Victories, The Military Genius of Stonewall Jackson, Alexander writes: "Miles was mortally wounded by one of the last rounds dropped into the town." If the line of defense is not considered "the town," then this account is doubtful, since Miles was riding back and forth with Binney on the line of defense.

Another account in Teeter's A Matter of Hours states that Miles had rebuked a gun commander for continuing to fire and jumped to the barrel of the cannon and waved the white handkerchief tied to his sword. At this moment, a shell burst, wounding him in the thigh.

Missionary's report

But Teeter also includes another report from 1905 with a different view. A missionary named Newcomer was called to the northern Michigan bedside of a dying farmer named Parks, who claimed that he was present on Bolivar Heights that Monday morning. Parks recounted that, after the white flag had been hoisted, an Illinois light battery continued to fire.

"Miles rode up and ordered the captain stop firing, shouting, 'Can't you see the signals - we've surrendered.'

"The captain turned to the colonel and damned him in terrific language, at which the colonel repeated his order and turned away, riding straight along the crest. ... Captain Phillips watched him, cursing, and after a moment's pause shouted the order 'Gun No. 3: half-a-second fuse shell.' Then 'Gunner No. 3: See that man on the horse? You fix that man! Miss your mark and you die in your boots!'

"The gunner fired and the shot exploded under Miles' horse, killing the horse and wounding Miles in the leg - terribly mangling the calf. ... A Confederate surgeon was detailed to attend him. Not a Union surgeon would go near him." That account is not surprising considering how angry the Union troops were when they learned they had been surrendered.

Teeter writes: "Captain McGrath [an Irish-born artillerist from New York City] burst into tears, exclaiming, 'Boys, we have got no country now.' Other officers exhibited a corresponding degree of grief, while the soldiers were decidedly demonstrative in their manifestations of rage. ... The indignation of Union men and officers at the surrender was terrible - some sobbed like children, some swore, some were angry beyond words."

Teeter continues: "Miles' death was horrible. Soldiers from the 126th New York and from the 9th Vermont were drafted to help carry the mortally wounded commander in a blanket to a spot near the Charlestown Pike, where an ambulance could reach him. ... At the hospital in Harper's Ferry it was concluded that nothing could be done for the man and he lingered on in excruciating pain for over a day, with his aide Binney holding his hand most of the time."

Miles died in late afternoon the next day. His "rude coffin" was escorted through Baltimore to mixed public response. Finally, the consensus seemed to rally to his defense.

He was buried beside his wife, Sarah Brisco Miles, and his infant son.