A Confederate plan to take the high ground behind Union lines was thwarted at Cress' Ridge on July 3, 1863, and raised the reputation of the "boy general," George Armstrong Custer, by his Charge of the Wolverines, so named because Custer commanded Michigan cavalry regiments, and residents of that state, nicknamed the Wolverine State, found themselves known as "Wolverines."

Clever Union anticipation of the maneuver and key mistakes by Confederate commanders, resulted in a defeat of Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart's horsemen.

The 139th anniversary of this battle in the campaign for Cemetery Ridge will be re-enacted at 11 a.m. Sunday, July 7.

The decisions that led the fighting and the famous Charge of the Wolverines were determined in the previous two days of fighting.

Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee had met with little success in two days of trying to break the Union hold on Cemetery Ridge.

So Lee decided on one final charge on the afternoon of the third day -- a 15,000-man direct assault at the Union front line.

Trusting Stuart

A frontal attack might well be successful, but Lee knew he would need someone to watch the Union's back door. He trusted that task to Stuart, who was aided by Brig. Gens. Wade Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee, a nephew of Robert E. Lee, as well as Col. John R. Chambliss.

Stuart's assistant adjutant general during the Gettysburg campaign, Maj. Henry B. McClellan, a cousin of Union Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, commander of the Army of the Potomac in the early years of the war, described the Confederate preparations for battle that morning:

"At about noon Stuart, with [Brig. Gen. Albert G.] Jenkins' and Chambliss' brigades, moved out on the York turnpike, to take position on the left of the Confederate line of battle. Hampton and Fitz Lee were directed to follow.

"Stuart's object was to gain position where he could protect the left of [Lt. Gen. Richard S.] Ewell's corps, and would also be able to observe the enemy's rear and attack it in case the Confederate assault on the Federal lines was successful. He proposed, if opportunity offered, to make a diversion which might aid the Confederate infantry to carry the heights held by the Federal army."

Lee approved, and Stuart set out to attack the rear position of the Union forces.

'A commanding ridge'

After marching about 2 miles down the York turnpike, Stuart turned to his right and located what he called in his official reports "a commanding ridge which completely controlled a wide plain of cultivated fields stretching towards Hanover on the left, and reaching the base of the mountain spurs among which the enemy held position."

Better known as Cress' Ridge, the crest was covered on its north end by woods, which enveloped the turnpike, and which Stuart believed would conceal his presence from Union scouts. Scanning the ground below, the general sought further cover.

McClellan's account continues:

"Near where the woods terminated on the southwest, and on the slope of the hill, stood a stone dairy, covering a spring. On the plain below, and not more than 300 yards from the foot of the hill, stood a large frame barn, known as the Rummel barn. A glance satisfied Stuart that he had gained the position he wanted.

"The roads leading from the rear of the Federal line of battle were under his eye and could be reached by the prolongation of the road by which he had approached. Moreover, the open fields, although intersected by many fences, admitted of movement in any direction. ... Lieutenant Colonel Vincent Witcher's battalion, of Jenkins' brigade, was dismounted and sent to hold the Rummel barn and a line of fences on its right."

McClellan's account indicates that Stuart knew he had gained a strategic position from which to launch his attack.

A welcoming party

But what he did not know was that the Union had prepared a welcoming party in case of an attempted attack in the rear by Confederate cavalry.

In the early morning hours, Brig. Gen. David McMurtie Gregg was camped with his 2nd Cavalry Division on the extreme right of the Union line when he got the order from Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton, the Union cavalry commander.

Gregg was told to pull his troops back and remain alert for an attack on the rear.

Gregg's official account of the three days of Gettysburg describes his response to Pleasanton's orders:

"The First and Third Brigades were again posted on the right of the infantry, but about three-fourths of a mile nearer the Baltimore and Gettysburg turnpike. This position was taken because I learned that the [Second] Brigade, of the Third Division, was occupying my position of the day before. A regiment was dismounted and put in the woods as skirmishers, but the enemy was not found in any considerable force."

Gregg had relocated his men further from the Union line than Pleasanton ordered, but closer to the ridge that Stuart's men would soon occupy. This positioning proved advantageous when Gregg learned at noon of large enemy cavalry movements to the right.

As McClellan describes it: "Stuart pushed one of [the Union] guns to the edge of the woods and fired a number of random shots in different directions, himself giving orders to the gun.

"This, quite as much as the subsequent appearance of Hampton and Fitz Lee in the open ground to the left, announced his position to the enemy's cavalry. ... [Gregg] was, therefore, on alert before Stuart's arrival."

Stuart's decision to then fire the shots that disclosed his location to the Union cavalry has long been the subject of debate by military historians.

McClellan offers two possibilities: "I suppose that they may have been a prearranged signal by which he was to notify General Lee that he had gained a favorable position; or, finding that none of the enemy were within sight, he may have desired to satisfy himself whether the Federal cavalry was in the immediate vicinity before leaving the strong position he then held."

Hearing the shots, Gregg readied his Union troops for battle.

He had been ordered to send the 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Division to join Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick on the left of the main Union line.

Custer 'well pleased'

But knowing the importance of resisting the Confederate charge at his army's rear, he retained this brigade, which was commanded by 24-year-old Brig. Gen. George Armstrong Custer.

"General Custer," Gregg wrote, "fully satisfied of the intended attack, was well pleased to remain with his brigade."

Custer, who had recently been promoted to brigadier general, looked on while Union skirmishers from the 5th Michigan and the 1st New Jersey engaged Witcher's troops at the Rummel barn.

Witcher's men fought at an extreme disadvantage because, in the absence of Jenkins, who was wounded the previous day, the acting brigadier general had equipped his sharpshooters with just 10 rounds of ammunition each. Still, they were able to resist the initial Union charge.

"The very superior force of dismounted skirmishers of the enemy," Gregg wrote, "required the line to be reinforced by one of General Custer's regiments [the 5th Michigan]. At this time, the skirmishing became very brisk on both sides, and an artillery fire was begun by the enemy and ourselves."

Artillery battle

In this artillery battle, Hampton's official report says the Confederate forces were once again outgunned. "We had for the brigades but two pieces of artillery," Hampton said, "while the enemy apparently had two batteries in position."

About this time, Stuart's messenger reached Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee, asking them to leave their brigades and report to the front line.

"Thinking that it would not be proper for both of us to leave the ground at the same time, I told General Lee that I would go to General Stuart first, and on my return, that he could go," Hampton later explained.

In the confusion, Hampton never found Stuart. He returned to find his brigade marching toward the battlefield, on Fitzhugh Lee's orders.

"This order I countermanded," Hampton said, "as I did not think it a judicious one, and the brigade resumed its former position." The damage was done, however, as this charge disclosed Hampton's position to the enemy.

Meanwhile, the skirmishing near the Rummel barn had reached a fever pitch. Stuart dispatched nearly all of his forward cavalry (Jenkins' and Chambliss' brigades), who dismounted and engaged the Union troops with the help of Witcher's rearmed men.

Realizing that all of his men were committed, Chambliss sent an officer to Hampton and Lee to request more support. Hampton, "seeing that support was essential," ordered the dispatch of the 1st North Carolina and the Jeff Davis Legion.

The horsemen charged into battle. The Northern troops, including Custer's 5th Michigan, now began to bow under the pressure of both mounted and dismounted Confederate assailants.

Custer quickly gathered his newly commissioned 7th Michigan to meet the swarming rebel forces.

"Come on, you Wolverines!" he shouted, as he led them into the fight. But they were gravely outnumbered.

Pvt. Allan Price of the 6th Michigan saw the disastrous results. "The 7th Michigan made a charge and got all cut to pieces. It was the first charge they ever made and it was awful work."

The regiment lost more than 100 men in this rush to battle.

Hampton, watching from the ridge, saw his troops overwhelm Custer's Michiganders.

"But," he wrote, "in their eagerness they followed him too far, and encountered his reserves in heavy force.

"Seeing the state of affairs at this juncture, I rode rapidly to the front, to take charge of these two regiments, and, while doing this, to my surprise I saw the rest of my brigade (excepting the Cobb Legion) and Fitz Lee's brigade charging."

Hampton's assistant adjutant general, Capt. T.J. Barker, had mistaken Hampton's ride to order a retreat by his overzealous forces as a signal for an all-out charge by his brigades to support Chambliss.

A costly mistake

"A mistake which was very naturally brought about," Hampton wrote, "by the appearance of affairs on the field." It was a costly mistake.

The 1st and 2nd South Carolina regiments, along with the Phillips Legion, charged after Hampton. Union soldiers looked on in wonder.

"A grander spectacle than their advance has rarely been beheld," observed Union Capt. William E. Miller of the 3rd Pennsylvania.

"They marched with well-aligned fronts and steady reins. Their polished saber-blades dazzled in the sun. All eyes turned upon them.

"Shell and shrapnel met the advancing Confederates and tore through their ranks. Closing the gaps as though nothing had happened, on they came. As they drew nearer, canister was substituted by our artillerymen for shell, and horse after horse staggered and fell. Still they came on."

Custer and his men of the 1st Michigan still had one charge left in them. "Come on, you Wolverines!" the boy general shouted again, as he rode toward the oncoming rebels.

Custer's second charge proved to be the decisive one.

Hampton, resigned to the fact that his brigade was now fully engaged in battle, rallied his troops, calling out, "Charge them, my brave boys, charge them!" But soon he found himself surrounded by Union horsemen.

"As I was endeavoring to extricate the 1st North Carolina and the Jeff Davis Legion," Hampton wrote, "I was wounded, and had to leave the field."

Hampton was slashed in the forehead by a saber, and again was wounded as he galloped away in retreat. Outnumbered, the Confederate troops began to fall back under Custer's relentless charge. Stuart's cavalry attack had been foiled.

McClellan offered this insightful summary of the battle:

"As soon as General Gregg was aware of Stuart's presence he wisely assumed the aggressive, and forced upon Stuart a battle in which he had nothing to gain but the glory of fighting; while Gregg himself performed the paramount duty of protecting the right flank of the Federal army."

Michael Casey is a senior majoring in journalism at Loyola College in Baltimore. This article was written as part of a practicum at The Sun.