When Confederate plans went awry on June 26, 1862, Confederate Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill decided to wage a costly offensive against Union Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter at Beaver Dam Creek. Unsupported, Hill's forces were repulsed and defeated.

Hill expected Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's arrival imminently as he forced a crossing of the Chickahominy River and led his six brigades known as the Light Division through the town of Mechanicsville to encounter Porter's corps entrenched behind Beaver Dam Creek.

To prevent Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's Army of the Potomac from capturing the Confederate capital at Richmond, Va., just 6 miles away, Gen. Robert E. Lee hoped to successfully attack his right wing, where Porter was positioned, separated from the rest of the Union army by the Chicahominy River.

Lee believed this would force McClellan to defend his supply line from the White House and in doing so, expose his troops to defeat in the open when his troops crossed the Chickahominy River.

Lee's plan

Lee's plan, General Orders No. 75, called for frontal attacks by A.P. Hill and Maj. James Gen. Longstreet, and an assault on Porter's right flank by Jackson and Maj. Gen. D.H. Hill.

A.P. Hill was the youngest of the four generals at 36 and the least experienced, having served as a major general for only one month.

According to Lee's order, Jackson was to march toward Beaver Dam and communicate his approach to Brig. Gen. Lawrence O'Bryan Branch, who would clear Meadow Bridges so that A.P. Hill's Light Division could cross and advance to Mechanicsville. The town would then be clear for the crossing of the divisions of D.H. Hill and Longstreet.

The combined forces were to establish contact with Maj. Gen. Benjamin Huger and Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder in front of Richmond.

According to Stephen W. Sears, author of To the Gates of Richmond (1992), "General Lee's orders for the day were designed more for maneuver than for fighting." However, Lee's orders were not realized as planned.

Poor communications

Communication between the Southern generals went poorly.

Hill waited throughout the morning and afternoon for news of Jackson's approach or for a sign from Branch. Branch did not receive a communication from Jackson until about 10 o'clock. As he proceeded to carry out his own instructions, he was delayed by skirmishes and made only slow progress.

About 3 p.m., still not hearing from either general, Hill decided that Jackson must be near. According to the Official Records, Hill reported: "I determined to cross at once rather than hazard the failure of the whole plan by longer deferring it."

Lee was only 2 miles away from Hill, but Hill did not consult him. Union batteries beyond Mechanicsville fired on Hill's troops as he approached.

Hill ordered Brig. Gen. Charles W. Field's regiments, supported by Capt. William J. Pegram's six-gun battery, to capture Mechanicsville. Shortly after they did this, Lee arrived and learned that Hill had begun the assault without confirmation that Jackson was near. The battle was already under way.

By 5 p.m., there was still no word of Jackson's arrival or communication from Lee. Hill decided to take the offensive alone and attack across a large open plain toward the creek and the Union army.

Union troops retired to a position along Beaver Dam Creek on a high slope, from which the artillery and infantry controlled with 36 cannons an open field that Hill's troops had to cross. Hill assembled a front facing the creek, sending Brig. Gen. George B. Anderson to take out a battery on the left while Capt. David G. McIntosh's battery tried to draw its attention.

As Anderson's brigade crossed the creek, Lee ordered Hill to halt and hold his current position.

Lt. Thomas W. Sydnor, who was from the area, informed Lee that quicksand lined the bottom of the creek toward Hill's left. Upon receiving this information, Hill decided he would attempt passing on the right, instead of halting.

Fighting at the river

Hill's troops continued to attempt to force a crossing and battled fiercely, but in vain. Hill wrote that Brig. Gen. William Dorsey Pender's brigade "made a gallant but abortive attempt to force a crossing" but faced heavy fire. Brig. Gen. Roswell S. Ripley's brigade fought bravely as well - but mistakenly charged down a hill directly into enemy guns and faced substantial losses.

According to the Official Records, Ripley recalled:

"General Pender's brigade and the two regiments of my own advanced rapidly on the right, while the remainder of my command moved against the front, driving back the enemy from his advanced positions and closing in upon the batteries and their heavy infantry supports, all of which poured upon our troops a heavy and incessant fire of shell, canister, and musketry

"A millrace, with scarped banks, and in some places waist-deep in water, ran along the front of the enemy at a distance ranging from 50 to 100 yards. To this position our troops succeeded in advancing, notwithstanding the fire of the enemy was exceedingly."

Only Col. Edward L Thomas' and parts of Lt. Col. Robert W. Folsom's regiments were able to cross, where they held their own until the end of the battle, withdrew, and rejoined their brigades on the south side of the creek.

On the Union side, Porter's force consisted of two brigades commanded by Brig. Gen. John F. Reynolds and Brig. Gen. George G. Meade. According to Porter's report in the Official Records, they "coolly reserved their fire until the head of the enemy's column was nearly across, then opened a terribly destructive volley in the face and flank of the advancing force.

"The enemy then deployed and took position on the opposite side of the ravine, placing artillery in such positions as they could select, and from that time until after dark employed their time mainly in persistent efforts to drive us from our position by mere fire of musketry and artillery - efforts which I cannot but think were attended with double the loss to them that we suffered."

Losses

James I. Robertson Jr., historian and author of General A. P. Hill: The Story of a Confederate Warrior (1987), cited the losses of these two Confederate brigades as severe and most likely about 1,400 men. By comparison, Porter reported his own losses at 361 men.

Though Lee never censured Hill for this attack, he did call Sydnor to testify in Hill's presence concerning Hill's receipt of Lee's orders to halt the attack. Hill himself seemed satisfied that he had done right by not delaying the whole plan and concluded his report by writing: "The battle ceased about 9 o'clock, my brigades resting along the creek, the object of this attack, viz., clearing the way for Longstreet, having been fully accomplished. It was never contemplated that my division alone should have sustained the shock of this battle, but such was the case, and the only assistance I received was from Ripley."

In retrospect, historians have called Hill's decision both courageous and imprudent. Yet, they agree that Hill was justified in expecting Jackson's arrival, according to Jackson's own projected timetable.

Jackson told the other generals he would be ready to advance into battle by 3 a.m. June 25. However, Jackson had about 40 miles of poor, marshy, and unfamiliar valley terrain to cross. Leaving his meeting with Lee, Jackson would not be able to join his troops until the morning of June 24.

'Unrealistic appraisal'

Clifford Dowdy, historian and author of The Seven Days (1978), writes: "Under these conditions, for Jackson to estimate that his troops would be in a position to move into action in 36 hours from the meeting was an unrealistic appraisal not characteristic of him.

"Jackson had a reputation for fast marches, yet Longstreet was wary of his capability to sustain such a timeframe. Under Longstreet's suggestion, the commencement date for the battle was pushed forward another day to June 26. When Hill employed his troops, Jackson was still six hours behind schedule."

When the firing ceased on the night of the 26th, Jackson had still not arrived. He was at Hundley's Corner, where he had been since 5 o'clock.

Confused by Lee's orders that Hill would be driving the enemy out of Mechanicsville then coming to his support, Jackson found no enemy when he arrived at his position and to push farther would require several hours of movement for his 15,000 infantry.

Jackson bivouacked his army about 6 p.m. without further communication. No meeting of the forces of the four generals and their soldiers ever took place as Lee planned.

Dowdy concludes: "Lee's improvised offensive sent his four columns of infantry on four roads to intercept McClellan where McClellan was not going to be." Lee's first battle as commanding general was a failure.

Regina Puleo is a senior majoring in English at Loyola College in Baltimore. This article was written as part of a practicum at The Sun.

Foes at Mechanicsville

Blue: Fitz John Porter

The Union 5th Corps defending Mechanicsville was commanded by Brig.. Gen. Fitz John Porter.

Porter was born Aug. 31, 1822, in Portsmouth, N.H. His father and uncle were naval officers.He graduated eighth in a class of 41 from West Point in 1845 and soon saw action in the 1846-1848 war with Mexico, where he was wounded at Chapultepec and won brevet promotions to captain and major. From 1849 to 1855 he served as an instructor at West Point before being assigned to Albert Sidney Johnson's command during the Utah Expedition against the Mormons.

At the outbreak of the Civil War, Porter was promoted to colonel of the 15th U.S. Infantry on May 14, 1861, and three days later he was promoted to brigadier general. His Civil War service began with a posting as chief of staff for Maj. Gen. Robert Patterson's forces at Harpers Ferry, Va.

Porter led the 1st Division of the 3rd Corps at the start of the Peninsula Campaign and directed the siege of Yorktown. On May 18, 1862, Porter was named commander of the 5th Corps and promoted to major general on July 4, 1862. At Beaver Dam Creek and Gaines' Mill at the start of the Seven Days' Battles, Porter bore the brunt of fighting at Mechanicsville and Gaines' Mill, handling his troops capably. At Malvern Hill he was again in a key role, covering the retreat of the Union army to Harrison's Landing.

After the Union army was withdrawn from the Virginia peninsula, Porter was sent to reinforce Maj. Gen. John Pope in Northern Virginia. At the Second Battle of Bull Run he was ordered to attack the flank and rear of Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's position, but he could not carry out the order because Maj. Gen. James Longstreet's forces arrived to block the movement.

Pope blamed Porter for the loss at Bull Run and had him court-martialed for disobedience of orders in the face of the enemy, a charge of which he was found guilty in Jan. 21, 1863. Porter was then dismissed from the army.

An inquiry conducted by Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield in 1878 found that Porter had been correct in not making an assault that Longstreet would have crushed and that his actions probably saved Pope from an even worse defeat. President Chester A. Arthur dismissed the conviction four years later, and Porter was reappointed to the army by an act of Congress in 1886, to date from May 1861, and put on the retired list.

Porter died at his home in Morriston, N.J., May 21, 1901, and is buried in Green-Wood Cemetery, Brooklyn, N.Y.

Gray: A.P. Hill

The Confederate division attacking Mechanicsville was commanded by Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill.

Hill was born in Culpeper County, Va., Nov. 9, 1825, and graduated from West Point in 1847, standing 15th in a class of 38.

He served in the Mexican War in 1847 and afterward in the hostilities with the Seminoles and on the frontier.

Hill resigned his U.S. army commission as a first lieutenant and entered the Confederate service in March 1861 as colonel of the 13th Virginia Regiment.

He was promoted to brigadier general Feb. 26, 1862, and fought at Williamsburg, Va., before being promoted major general May 26, 1862.

During the Seven Days' Battles, Hill led his division at Mechanicsville, Gaines' Mill and Frayser's Farm.

Hill's command was usually called "the Light Division," for its speed in marching, according to Col. Mark M. Boatner in The Civil War Dictionary.

After fighting at Cedar Mountain, Second Bull Run and the capture of Harpers Ferry, Hill was at the right place and time to launch devastating counterattacks at both Antietam and Fredericksburg.

When Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson was wounded at Chancellorsville, Va., on May 2, 1862, Hill took command of the corps but was wounded carrying out Jackson's orders to "press right in."

On May 24, 1863, Hill was promoted to lieutenant general and given command of the new 3rd Corps, which he led to Gettysburg, Pa.

At Bristoe Station, Hill ordered an impetuous assault without proper reconnaissance, which resulted in a costly repulse on Oct. 14, 1863, and, ill, he was circumvented at the Wilderness when Gen. Robert E. Lee took over command of the corps. He relinquished command temporarily after the battle and missed the fighting Spotsylvania but returned for the North Anna and Cold Harbor.

He took part in the defense of besieged Petersburg, Va., although he was ill during part of the winter of 1864-1865.

With the lines around the city collapsing on April 2, 1865, he was shot and killed in an encounter with federal stragglers. He is buried in Richmond, Va.

Despite Hill's struggles with his health - he contracted gonorrhea in 1845, typhoid fever in 1847, yellow fever in 1850 and possibly malaria in 1855, all of which could have had debilitating effects - Lee held him among his most effective combat officers.

Both Jackson and Lee called for Hill and his division on their deathbeds.