WASHINGTON -- When Vice President Al Gore launched a special partnership with Russia's prime minister in 1993, the effort seemed full of promise and a perfect showcase for Gore's high-technology, futuristic vision.

Tapping the talents of agency bosses and scientists, the two countries would cooperate on space, energy exploration, even public health -- projects seen as building blocks in a grand strategy of helping Russia discard its Communist past and grow into a free-market democracy.

But as Prime Minister Yevgeny M. Primakov arrives this week for the 11th meeting of their joint commission, the original promise has been all but overwhelmed by the problems facing Russia and strains in the relationship.

Its economy collapsing, hemorrhaging foreign capital, Russia has all it can handle to keep its government afloat and its strategic forces from crumbling. Instead of working with Viktor S. Chernomyrdin, who was fired by Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin in March 1998, Gore is now dealing with his third Russian prime minister, Primakov, who has more of the reputation of a Soviet bureaucrat than a reformer. Instead of a briefcase loaded with ideas for joint programs, Primakov is expected to bring a blatant pitch for more money from the International Monetary Fund.

The commission, rather than offering an exhibit for Gore's presidential race, is being cited by critics as either irrelevant or an example of what's wrong with the Clinton administration's approach to Russia.

Gore's national security adviser, Leon S. Fuerth, is unbowed by the evident obstacles and the criticism.

"The commission has turned out, to our surprise, to be very malleable, very durable and very forgiving to changed circumstances because it is doing something that both parties want to get done," Fuerth says.

The picture seemed brighter in 1993 when Americans were looking for practical ways of steadying Russia on its course toward becoming a Western-style democracy.

"At the very beginning we asked, 'What are some major win-win areas of cooperation that are strategic in scale?' " Fuerth recalls.

One was the International Space Station. Drawing on Russian expertise was expected to cut American costs and speed up the program.

Another was energy exploration, seen both as a major way to draw investment and a chance to correct the environmentally dangerous deterioration of Russian infrastructure.

Beyond strategic goals, the Gore team believed that "something meaningful should come out of it for people in their lives," says Fuerth. The group looked for ways to boost immunization, fight lead poisoning and treat diabetes.

Drawing on a number of Cabinet agencies, like Health and Human Services, that ordinarily deal only with domestic problems, the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation drew much of the top tier of the U.S. government to meetings in Washington and Moscow.

It offered a fertile field for the Gore and Fuerth team to pursue their mutual fascination with science, technology and problems that cross international boundaries.

A trusted staff adviser who eschews the trappings of Washington glamour, Fuerth, 59, is virtually unknown outside the Washington Beltway and a mystery even to some who have worked with him.

Yet by a 1997 presidential directive, he ranks as one of President Clinton's foreign-policy principals, giving him the same standing in national security meetings as Clinton adviser Samuel R. Berger and Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright.

A former Foreign Service officer, Fuerth joined the House Select Intelligence Committee in the late 1970s and became its resident expert on arms-control verification. He soon attracted the attention of a young Tennessee congressman, Albert Gore Jr. Working together ever since, they are so intellectually compatible that they speak in shorthand.

"Sometimes, I suggest and he decides. More often, he is well out in front of me," Fuerth says. "He's got the insight; it's my job to put a structure underneath it."

The commission is part of that structure, but as a foreign-policy platform for Gore, it's questionable.

The space station is $1 billion over budget and two years behind schedule, says an infuriated Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner Jr., the Wisconsin Republican who chairs the House Science Committee.

"Russia has defaulted on every one of its commitments," Sensenbrenner says. "The administration is flat-out in denial. They're using an over-stretched NASA to provide foreign aid to the Russian government."

Fuerth acknowledges that the administration has had to search for ways to help Russia live up to its end of the deal. But he insists that Russia's contribution continues to be valuable.

Energy development of the Russian north drew interest from several Western oil companies, but has been stalled by Moscow's seeming inability to take the necessary tax and regulatory steps to attract investment.

Russia recently approved a production-sharing agreement, but by now the weak global oil market has sapped enthusiasm.

The original hope placed in the Gore-Chernomyrdin commission "has basically been overtaken" by changes in the Russian government and Moscow's inability to deliver, says Sherman Garnett, an expert on Russia at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Michael Mandelbaum, who teaches at the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, says the commission was created based on several assumptions that no longer hold up: that Russia was headed in the right direction, that Yeltsin was the man to bet on in Moscow, and that Western money would be forthcoming and helpful.

Still, the commission provides a "catalyst" for the relationship, says Toby Gati, a Russia expert at the law firm of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer and Feld. It's a way to demonstrate that the United States hasn't given up on Russia and allows regular contact without the high stakes and symbolic trappings of a summit.

Gore's enthusiasm seems undiminished. He's likely to spend part of his time closeted with Primakov talking about tuberculosis testing, HIV, and ways the Russian government can help lure investment for small business -- chiefly by getting out of the way. The same commission format has been replicated with South Africa, Egypt, Kazakstan and Ukraine.

What does this show us about a future Gore foreign policy? Fuerth has a ready answer: "A very broad strategic vision combined with disciplined analysis, coupled with practical specifics, tenaciously executed."

Pub Date: 3/23/99