WASHINGTON -- As the FBI prepared to question a scientist last week in the alleged theft of American nuclear-weapons secrets by China, former U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry was closeted across the Pacific for several days with key Chinese military and security experts, talking shop.
Perry is among thousands of Americans who meet regularly with their Chinese counterparts in exchanges on scientific, military and technological subjects that have drawn warm praise from both sides.
But now, as charges of lax security reverberate through the nation's military-scientific community in the wake of the espionage probe, academics and experts are bracing for a new climate of suspicion that could freeze this growing cooperation.
"I agree that it could lead to a new round of McCarthyism, or something very much like it," said Ronald Montaperto, a senior research professor at National Defense University and a China specialist. "I have never seen a response like this before," he said, referring to the intense Washington reaction to the spying charges.
The scrutiny is especially intense at the nation's three nuclear weapons research facilities, the Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore and Sandia national laboratories. Los Alamos, where the alleged theft occurred, hosts hundreds of Chinese scientists as part of a U.S.-China lab-to-lab program begun in 1995, aimed at fostering long-lasting professional relationships.
A decade ago, when the number of foreign visitors at the labs was only a fraction of what it is today, the General Accounting Office began sounding the alarm about loose controls. But the Energy Department only recently clamped down on security.
Ever since the Manhattan Project -- code name for the World War II development of the atomic bomb -- the nation's nuclear weapons laboratories have been torn between the desire for intellectual freedom and the sharing of ideas, and the constraints of national security.
"To get your work done most effectively, you want anyone who can understand what you're doing, anyone who can critique your approach or theory, to weigh in," said Michael May, a prominent physicist and retired director of Lawrence Livermore in California. "But conversely, the more people that know, the more chance there is for a leak."
Washington officials imagine the labs as military fortresses securing some of the nation's most sensitive secrets. But the scientists see their sprawling laboratories as academic campuses where they conduct cutting-edge scientific research, some of which happens to relate to nuclear weapons.
And scientists simply do not believe vital scientific advances can be kept secret. A seminal report to the federal Defense Science Board in 1970 by a task force of eminent scientists concluded that important classified information is unlikely to remain secure for more than five years, and is more likely to become known within 12 months of discovery.
As the science of nuclear weaponry becomes increasingly complex, the laboratories' esoteric research is becoming increasingly difficult to classify as defense or non-defense related, making security controls that much more difficult.
For instance, Hugh DeWitt, a Livermore physicist, is conducting joint research projects with Chinese scientists on the effect of extremely high temperatures and pressures on different materials. The work could reveal more about the inner workings of stars, but it could also shed light on the inner workings of hydrogen bombs.
"This is problematic from the viewpoint of Washington, D.C., but not from the laboratory," DeWitt said, adding that "it is very appropriate for the labs to have good contacts with outside scientists."
Security officials in Washington appear baffled by these scientists at times.
"The culture of science and culture of security are fundamentally at odds," said Steven Aftergood, director of the project on government secrecy at the Federation of American Scientists. "Scientists want to publish, and they want to discuss their findings because that's how they learn new things and that's how they discover mistakes."
Scientific cooperation is one of the areas most prone to security leaks, but is just one of many areas where Americans and Chinese share their knowledge and ideas.
"The extent, purpose and variety are multitudinous," said Jan Berris, vice president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, which sponsored the recent trip by Perry and a group of prominent American national security experts. About 25 government agencies have formal relationships with Chinese organizations, she said.
In both countries, there are often close ties between the top scientists and national-security establishments.
Mathematician Perry is one example. As defense secretary, he stepped up military exchanges with the Chinese on the theory that the better they understood the United States and its capability, the less likely they were to miscalculate and blunder into war. Recently, he has sought to foster cross-strait dialogue between Beijing and Taipei.
It was a seemingly benign crash of a satellite launcher that ignited the furor over Chinese espionage. In trying to help the Chinese correct the fault in their rocket guidance system, a U.S. firm gave out information that would be valuable in missile development.
"We ought to stay engaged with China -- and Russia too -- but you've got to make sure your pocket isn't picked," said former CIA Director James Woolsey.
Pub Date: 3/14/99