THE LATE Sen. J. William Fulbright was too Southern and too British to become a great American, I wrote here last week, and explained what I meant by "too Southern." Today
Too British.
Fulbright was a Rhodes scholar, and no one could ever doubt that he was a learned intellectual. His critics in Arkansas taunted him as "British Billy." He often said things that suggested even to his admirers that he would have been more comfortable in a parliament than a Congress.
For example, in 1946 he made headlines (and an enemy of Harry Truman) with this:
"Clear Republican majorities have been elected in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. We have a Democratic president. Under these conditions, neither party will have complete responsibility for or the authority to govern, and each party will place the blame for the inevitable stalemate on the other party. . .
"I have suggested as a possible solution to this difficulty that the president, after consulting the Republican members of Congress, appoint a Republican secretary of state and then resign. This would simply mean that we are turning over the full responsibility for our government to the party which won a decisive victory in the election."
This was no off-hand comment. Fulbright went on to explain at length and in detail what he saw as the constitutional, legal and political justification for this veddy British solution to a demonstrated public vote of no confidence in a party.
Nor was this a one-time fall from American grace. In 1954, the senator proposed that Dwight Eisenhower turn the presidency over to a Democrat if Democrats won control of Congress. (Democrats did, and Ike ignored Fulbright, as Harry had.)
There is a certain irony in Fulbright's Oxonian view of a legislature's role. When he became chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, a historian said of it, "There is no parallel in any other democratic parliament for the power wielded by the Foreign Relations Committee." That is because the Constitution requires the Senate to give its advice and consent to a president on foreign policy. Fulbright wanted to cut the committee down to European size.
Two years after he became chairman, he said, "It seems clear to me that in foreign affairs, a Senate cannot initiate or force large events, or substitute its judgment for that of the president. . . "
A biographer wrote in 1963, "The persistent theme in Fulbright's speeches is a plea for legislative self-restraint in foreign affairs; rather than restrict or instruct, he would have Congress widen the discretion of the executive. . . Fulbright [wants] the Senate to provide more consent and less advice."
To his grief, Fulbright saw presidents become far more powerful than any prime minister -- and his committee impotent. British Billy ended his career futilely decrying presidential policies in Vietnam.