On paper Gen. Michael Carns looks like a good candidate to run the Central Intelligence Agency. Given President Clinton's mixed record of appointments in the national security field, however, some wariness is justified. The retired Air Force officer's predecessor, R. James Woolsey, also had very good credentials to become director of central intelligence. He resigned in less than two years, after failing to get a grip on that troubled agency and losing the confidence of administration officials and key members of Congress. Admiral Bobby Inman, the president's second choice for defense secretary, had even more impressive credentials. He self-destructed before he was even confirmed.
Those gloomy reflections on the recent past may prove to have been unduly pessimistic. We ardently hope so. Even with the end of the Cold War, an effective CIA is critical to the nation's security. Perhaps even more so, because the nature of any threats against the nation's well-being will be less obvious than when U.S. intelligence concentrated on one prime enemy. Names of the world's future trouble spots were until recently only obscure clues in crossword puzzles. And the dangers are no longer necessarily military and political.
The CIA needs a strong manager. In his exemplary military career, General Carns has been just that. But the CIA is quite different from the Air Force. Discipline, teamwork and truthfulness are essential characteristics for success in the military; yet they are sadly lacking in the CIA. Deception is a critical element of its operations; but the deceptiveness has carried over into its internal operations and its relations with the rest of the government, including sometimes the White House. Mr. Woolsey was done in partly by disloyal subordinates and a failure to discipline senior officers who were responsible for the Aldrich Ames fiasco.
It may be that General Carnes' lack of experience in intelligence work is advantageous. He is described as a skillful commander who gets to the heart of a problem and succeeds in resolving it. If he can penetrate the CIA's bureaucratic labyrinths and decide how it can be restructured to meet new challenges, President Clinton and the nation will be well served. The fact that he has no ties to the old boys' network that stands in the way of reforming the CIA is a plus. But with only two years remaining in Mr. Clinton's first term, the new director does not have time for on-the-job training.