SARAJEVO, Bosnia -- The otherwise phlegmatic United Nations commander in Bosnia, Lt. Gen. Sir Michael Rose, does not take criticism well.
"It is a matter of supreme indifference to me if some people fail to absorb the facts," he insists.
He claims not to notice that demands for his resignation are multiplying by the day. "I get my reward from seeing improvement in the lives of millions of people," the 54-year-old British general snaps.
But as he nears the end of his one-year assignment, the strains of an unenviable mission and an untenable U.N. mandate show.
Initially, everything seemed to fall into place. A NATO ultimatum allowed General Rose to demilitarize Sarajevo in February. A Washington-brokered accord permitted him to position his peacekeepers in March between Bosnian Muslim and Croat forces who had been enemies. He was dubbed as a "can-do" U.N. general who would not take no for an answer.
Then, in April, came Gorazde. The Bosnian Serbs' offensive there stopped General Rose in his tracks. Trusting Serb claims, General Rose described the attack as "not serious." But within two weeks, NATO had launched three unimpressive bombing raids, a U.N. "safe area" had shrunk in size by almost half, scores of civilians had been killed -- and General Rose had learned about Balkan-style honor.
General Rose recently recited his now-familiar refrain on the U.N. Protection Force' success. He insisted there had been no mistakes since he took charge nearly a year ago.
Gorazde? "Oh, that was just an example of people trying to make policy on wild propaganda," General Rose said. "Our original assessments proved absolutely correct." He dismissed even the end result: "The damage done to Gorazde was done mainly between May and June of 1992 when Serbs were cleared out of their homes by vicious fighting."
In his view, he had correctly predicted everything -- including the bruises -- in advance of his appointment. Asked whether his on-the-ground experiences had uncovered flaws in the peacekeeping plan he drafted in Britain, he said: "Our plan proved absolutely correct. . . . We haven't had to change a thing."
He now hopes that plan will serve as the bible to future U.N. missions, a reminder that force should be applied in judicious doses and only as a last resort. And that bombing the Bosnian Serbs would backfire.
Although U.N. Security Council resolutions have singled out the Serb side as the predominant aggressor, leaders of the 37,000-soldier U.N. force in Bosnia and Croatia cling to their impartiality.
General Rose speaks in the language of "warring factions," none of whom wear white hats. "You won't ever hear me talk about a victim state," he said, "only victims."